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Rae,  Douglas,  et  al. Equalities. 
Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1981.  Pp.  xii + 210.  $19.50  (cloth). 
Defenders  of  equality  have  to  face  two  types  of  challenges.  One  lot  comes  from 
ideals  other  than  equality,  the  other  from  other  ideals  of  equality.  It  is  fair  to 
say  that  the  former  challenge  has  received  more  attention  than  the  latter  has. 
The  claims  of  equality  have  been  pitched  against  the  claims  of  such  diverse  ideals 
as liberty,  efficiency,  fairness,  order,  rights,  freedom,  and  autonomy.  In  contrast, 
Douglas  Rae  and  his  collaborators  (D.  Yates,  J.  Hochschild,  J.  Morone,  and  C. 
Fessler)  are  primarily  concerned,  in this  illuminating  and  stimulating  monograph, 
with  the  latter,  namely,  the  challenge  to  each  ideal  of  equality  from  other  ideals 
of  equality. 
Rae  is  keen  to  explain  that,  despite  taking  "the  ideal  of  equality  seriously 
enough  to  write  a  book  about  it,"  no  "unilateral  endorsement"  of  equality  is 
intended  (p.  19).  But  he  notes  that  "everywhere  one  hears  praise  for  the  idea  of 
equality"  (p.  2),  and  he  does  see  equality  as "the  most  powerful  ideal  of  our  time" 
(p.  19).  The  motivation  for  Rae's  study  comes  out  most  sharply  in  the  very  last 
sentences  of  the  text:  "Intellect  resists  equality  by  counterposing  rival  ideas  such 
as  efficiency,  freedom,  and  order.  Actuality  is  smarter,  for  it  chooses  the  one 
idea  that  is  more  powerful  than  order  or  efficiency  or  freedom  in  resisting 
equality.  That  idea  is,  of  course,  equality  itself"  (p.  150). 
"We are  always  confronted,"  says  Rae,  "with more  than  one  practical  meaning 
for  equality  and  equality  itself  cannot  provide  a basis  for  choosing  among  them." 
The  book  is devoted  to exploring  various  meanings  of equality-  their  interrelations, 
their  contradictions,  and  their  respective  claims.  There  is  also  an  ambitious  at- 
tempt-largely  successful-to  develop  a "structural  grammar  of  equality"  (p.  18). 
No  one  interested  in  examining  the  ideal  of  equality  can  afford  to  ignore  the 
clarification  and  the  understanding  that  Rae  has  offered  in  this  slender  volume. 
"Equality," argues  Rae,  "splits itself  into  many  distinct  notions,  each  an element 
in  its  grammar."  He  analyzes  each  of  these  notions  with  care,  contrasting  their 
contents  and  comparing  their  claims.  The  notions  are  also  classified  in  terms  of 
their characteristics.  "Equality's subject  may be individual-regarding,  bloc-regarding, 
or  segmental;  its  domain  may  be  straightforward,  marginal,  or  global;  the  idea 
of  equality  may  be  applied  directly  (equal  results)  or  may  be  a version  of  equal 
opportunity  (which  in  turn  may  equate  means  or  prospects);  equality  may  be 
based  on  uniform  lots  or  on  lots  equally  accommodating  differences;  it may  be 
absolute  or  relative  (and,  if  relative,  based  on  any  of  several  distinct  notions  of 
relative  equality).  There  are,  moreover,  many  subordinate  points  of  structural 
differentiation,  such  as  the  distinction  between  inclusive  and  exclusive  subjects, 
or  between  the  two  strategies  for  global  equality-compensatory  inequality  and 
redistribution  of  domains"  (pp.  132-33).  These  differences  are  worth  studying 
not  merely  to  understand  better  what  people  claim  when  they  demand  equality 
but  also  to  explain  the  acceptability  of  the  ideal  of  "equality"  in  widely  different 
and  mutually  antagonistic  circles.  Equality,  Rae  notes,  has  "turned  from  one 
thing  into  many  things  and  turned  from  something  frightening  to rich  men  into 
something  that  they  unofficially  endorse"  (p.  vii). 
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Given  this  plural  conception  of  equality,  the  question  is  bound  to  arise 
whether  the  idea  of  equality  is  not  completely  empty.  (For some  interesting 
arguments  in favor of that view, see Peter Westen, "The Empty Idea of Equality," 
Harvard Law Review 95 [1982]:  537-96.)  Rae evidently does not think so. Indeed, 
one of the uses of the "grammar of equality" outlined  by Rae is precisely to reject 
that suggestion, though he does not-somewhat  unfortunately (in myjudgment)- 
pose  the question  in quite that form. 
Each notion  of  equality,  Rae's analysis shows,  has its own  discipline.  They 
are  not  completely  pliable.  Nor  are  they,  typically, just  ad  hoc  constructions 
devised  to support  whatever  a person  wishes  to support  using  the  language  of 
equality. The  restrictions relate to the rationale of each of the concepts of equality 
discussed  by Rae,  and  this is where  his approach  is most  different  from  other 
works on the plurality of egalitarian  ideals.  (Compare  Westen, p. 596: "Equality 
will cease  to  mystify-and  cease  to  skew  moral  and  political  discourse-when 
people  come  to realize  that it is an empty  form  having  no  substantive  content 
of its own.  That  will occur as soon  as people  realize that every moral and legal 
argument  can be  framed  in the  form  of  an argument  for equality.") The  rules 
of  the  "grammar of  equality," explored  by  Rae,  are  not  really  so  loose.  Rae's 
approach  involves  an explicit  rejection,  on the one  hand,  of the romanticism  of 
"the" idea of equality and an implicit denial,  on the other, of the skeptical belief 
that equality  stands for 'just nothing." 
The  question  that does  not  get  adequately  addressed,  in  my judgment,  is 
one  about  the genesis  of the  plurality of egalitarian  notions.  Rae makes a good 
case for arguing that "the question is not 'Whether equality?' but 'Which  equality?'" 
(p.  19). But  there  is a further  question,  to wit,  Why so many different  notions 
of equality? Rae deals with this question  only indirectly and in passing.  But the 
question  may deserve  more attention  than that. Even our assessment of different 
demands of different notions of equality may well be affected by our understanding 
of the basic sources  of this plurality. 
I would  argue  that  one  important  source  of  the  plurality  of  the  idea  of 
equality is a more foundational plurality, namely, that of the notion of "advantage." 
A  person's  advantage  can be  seen  in many  radically different  ways-in  terms, 
respectively,  of achievements  or opportunities,  absolutes  or relatives, and using 
one  or more of several different  notions  of the goodness  of a person's state, for 
example, well-being, freedom, opulence, and need fulfillment. While these different 
ways of seeing  personal  (and group)  advantages  are obviously  not independent 
of each other,  neither  are they congruent. 
Does  it matter whether  the  plurality  is traced  to the  idea  of  advantage  or 
seen just  in terms of the conceptualization  of equality itself? For some  purposes 
it may not  matter  much,  or indeed  at all. But  one  consequence  of relating  the 
genesis  of plural equality to plural notions  of advantage  is that we would expect 
a similar plurality in other ideas that too derive from-  or depend  on-  the metric 
of advantage. 
To  take a simple  example,  the  content  of  the  notion  of efficiency  in  terms 
of human  achievements  or predicaments  (that the situation  is such that no one 
can be made  more  advantaged  without  cutting  into the advantages  of someone 
else)  must  depend  on  how  advantage  is seen.  If advantage  is seen  in absolute 
terms and identified with, say, utility, that notion of efficiency immediately becomes 
the concept of Pareto optimality. But corresponding  to other notions of advantage 
(involving  opulence,  freedom,  etc.), we shall have other  notions  of efficiency. 936  Ethics  July 1985 
The  contrast between  aggregative  considerations  (how large the total?) and 
distributive ones (how equally distributed?) can be combined  with quite different 
ways of judging  advantage.  And  corresponding  to Rae's plural equalities  there 
are, respectively, plural efficiencies, plural affluences, and plural social aggregates. 
It is, thus, arguable that Rae could have gone further-and  in some ways, perhaps, 
even deeper-in  tracing the sources of plurality of equalities, which he explores 
with  such  clarity  in  his  "grammar of  equality." But  we  must  not  grumble.  In 
providing an illuminating and most insightful analysis of plural equalities, Douglas 
Rae has, in any case,  put us greatly in his debt. 
AMARTYA  SEN 
All Souls College, Oxford 
Scheffler,  Samuel.  The Rejection  of Consequentialism:  A Philosophical  Investigation  of 
the Considerations  Underlying  Rival Moral Conceptions. 
Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1982.  Pp. ix+  133. $12.95  (cloth); $9.95  (paper). 
Samuel  Scheffler  holds  that the  good  of  an individual  is determined  from  her 
unique  "personal point  of view." By contrast, he says, consequentialism  assumes 
that there is a distinct, "impersonal" point of view for determining  "overall good." 
Scheffler  limits his attention  to act consequentialism,  which  holds  that we must 
always secure  as much  overall  good  as possible-that  any failure  to do  so,  on 
any occasion,  is morally wrong. 
Scheffler believes that this theory is fundamentally flawed, though his reasoning 
suggests  only  that  some  qualifications  on  it are  needed.  He  does  not  marshal 
arguments against consequentialism. His method is to see what plausible rationales 
could  underlie  established  lines  of criticism. He  suggests  that consequentialism 
should  be  qualified  by  an  "agent-centered  prerogative"  (ACP), which  permits 
one (sometimes)  to pursue one's own concerns rather than promote overall good. 
How  often,  how  uniformly,  indeed  on  what  precise  basis the  mandates  of  act 
consequentialism  should  be relaxed  is left unsettled:  Scheffler is concerned  only 
with the general  point of and need  for an ACP. He also argues that a much more 
radical departure  from consequentialism  is unnecessary:  this would be an "agent- 
centered  restriction" (ACR), which  would  require  (and not merely  permit)  one 
(sometimes)  not  to maximize  overall good.  The  rationale  for an ACP, Scheffler 
holds,  does  not require  an ACR, and he finds no plausible alternative  rationale 
for the more  radical restriction. 
Scheffler's  study  is a judicious,  closely  reasoned,  cautious,  but  nonetheless 
imaginative  and illuminating  analysis of familiar objections  to consequentialism. 
If his argument  is admittedly  inconclusive  and his results admittedly  somewhat 
vague,  he  can  still be  credited,  I believe,  with  significantly  raising  the  level  of 
theoretical  ethics. 
Although  Scheffler  tells us (p. vi) that he  has long  regarded  utilitarianism 
as "thoroughly abhorrent," he treats consequentialism,  the genus of utilitarianism, 
as initially quite plausible.  His strategy requires that he explain  its rationale, but 
what  he  says amounts  to this: once  we  accept  the  idea of  overall  good,  we are 
led to act consequentialism  because the most rational way of taking that idea into 
account is expressed  in the notion  that each of us is morally required to maximize 
overall good  whenever  we do anything  (p.  123). 